Abstract: In the problem of private "swarm" computing, agents wish to securely and distributively perform a computation on common inputs, in such a way that even if the entire memory contents of some of them are exposed, no information is revealed about the state of the computation. Recently, Dolev, Garay, Gilboa and Kolesnikov [7] considered this problem in the setting of information-theoretic security, showing how to perform such computations on input streams of unbounded length. However, the cost of their solution is exponential in the size of the nite state automaton (FSA) computing the function. In this work we are interested in an e cient (i.e., polynomial time) computation of the above model, at the expense of minimal additional assumptions. Relying on the existence of one-way functions, we show how to process unbounded inputs (polynomial in the security parameter) at a cost linear in , the number of FSA states. In particular, our algorithms achieve the following: In the case of ( , )-reconstruction (i.e., in which all agents participate in the reconstruction of the distributed computation) and at most − 1 agents are corrupted, the time required to process each input symbol and the time complexity for reconstruction are ( ), while agent storage is ( + ). In the case of ( − , )-reconstruction (where only − agents take part in the reconstruction) and at most agents are corrupted, the agents' storage is ( −1 − + ), the time required to process each input symbol is (
Introduction
Distributed computing has become an integral part of a variety of systems, including "swarm" computing, where agents perform a computation on common inputs. In these emerging computing paradigms, security (i.e., privacy and correctness) of the computation is of a primary concern. Indeed, in swarm computing, often considered in military contexts (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operation), security of the data and program state is of paramount importance.
In this work, we revisit the notion of perennial private distributed computation, rst considered by Dolev, Garay, Gilboa and Kolesnikov [7] . In such a computation, an unbounded sequence of commands (or inputs) are interpreted by several machines (agents) in a way that no information about the inputs as well as the state of the computation is revealed to an adversary who is able to "corrupt" the agents and examine their internal state, as long as up to a predetermined threshold of the machines are corrupted.
As a motivating example for the model, consider a swarm of UAVs that jointly conduct a reconnaissance mission. The UAVs monitor the same area, receiving the same input stream and use an internal program to process the input. The UAVs are threatened by an adversary that may physically cause them to crash, e.g. by a surface to air missile. When a UAV crashes in enemy territory, the adversary can take control of it and analyze its program and memory. However, once the UAV crashes it can no longer obtain the input stream that others in the swarm continue to receive. In this setting, the model we propose is especially useful. The controller of the UAV swarm can send it on a highly dangerous mission, in which communication may not be possible and in which part of the swarm may be disabled by the adversary. As long as the portion of corrupted UAVs is less than a certain threshold, the adversary does not obtain information on the state of the computation or the input received by the swarm. Dolev, Garay, Gilboa and Kolesnikov [7] were able to provide very strong (unconditional, or informationtheoretic) security for computations performed by a nite state machine (FSA), at the price however of the computation being e cient only for a small set of functions, whereas in general the complexity of the computation is exponential in the size (number of states) of the FSA computing the function.
In this work, we minimally weaken the original model by additionally assuming the existence of oneway functions (and hence consider adversaries that run in polynomial-time in the security parameter; more details below), and in return achieve very high e ciency in some cases as a function of the size of the FSA. We stress that we still consider computation on a priori unbounded number of inputs, and where the online (input-processing) phase incurs no communication. We now describe the model in more detail.
The setting. As in [7] , we consider a distributed computation setting in which a party -to whom we refer to as the dealer -has a nite state automaton (FSA) A which accepts a stream of inputs 1 , 2 , . . . , (a priori unbounded) received from an external source. The dealer delegates the computation to agents 1 , . . . , , by furnishing them with an implementation of A. The agents receive in a synchronized manner all the inputs for A during the online input-processing phase, where no communication between the agents is allowed whatsoever. Finally, given a signal from the dealer, the agents terminate the execution, submit their internal state to the dealer, who computes the state of A and returns it as output. We call this last step the reconstruction step.
We consider an attack model where an entity -called the adversary -is able to adaptively "corrupt" agents (i.e., inspect their internal state) during the online execution phase, up to a threshold < . ( We note that more general access structures may be naturally employed with our constructions.) We assume that the adversary is semi-honest and follows the speci ed protocol. We do not aim at maintaining the privacy of the automaton A. However, we wish to protect the secrecy of the current state of A through its execution and the secrecy of the inputs' history. We note that may have external information about the computation, such as partial inputs or length of the input sequence, state information, etc. This auxiliary information, together with the knowledge of A, may exclude the protection of certain con gurations, or even fully determine A's state. We stress that this cannot be avoided in any implementation; thus, our goal is to prevent the leakage or derivation by of any knowledge from seeing the execution traces that does not already possess. As mentioned above, our constructions relying on the hardness of inverting one-way functions dictates that the computational power of entities (adversary, agents), be polynomially bounded (in the security parameter ). Similarly, our protocols run on input streams of polynomial length. At the same time, we do not impose an a priori bound on its length; moreover, the size of the agents' state is independent of it. This allows to use agents of the same (small) complexity (storage and computational power) in all situations.
Our contributions. Our work is the rst signi cant extension of the work of [7] . Towards the goal of making never-ending and private distributed computation practical, we introduce an additional (minimal) assumption of existence of one-way functions (and hence pseudo-random number generators [PRGs] ), and propose the following constructions:
• A scheme with ( , ) reconstruction (where all agents participate in reconstruction), where the reconstruction complexity is ( ) and for each agent the processing time per input symbol is ( ) and the required storage is ( + ).
• A scheme with ( − , ) reconstruction (assuming that corrupted agents do not take part in the reconstruction), where the storage is ( +
−1 −
) bits and the processing time per input symbol is (
). Note that for some values of , e.g., = Θ( ), this quantity would be exponential in . However, this does not contradict our assumption on the computational power of the participants; rather it simply means that for a given , for some values of and this protocol cannot be executed in the allowed time. The time complexity of reconstruction is ( ). Regarding tools and techniques, the carefully orchestrated use of PRGs and secret-sharing techniques [15] allows our protocols to hide the state of the computation against an adaptive adversary by using share rerandomization. Typically, in the context of secret sharing, this is simply done by the addition of a suitable (i.e., passing through the origin) random polynomial. However, due to the no-communication requirement, share re-randomization is more challenging in our setting, particularly so in the more general case of the ( − , )-reconstruction protocol. We achieve share re-randomization by sharing PRG seeds among the players in a manner which allows players to achieve su cient synchronization of their randomness, which is resilient to corruptions.
Related work. Re ecting a well-known phenomenon in distributed computing, where a single point of failure needs to be avoided, a team of agents (e.g., UAVs) that collaborate in a mission is more robust than a single agent trying to complete a mission by itself (e.g., [1, 3] ). Several techniques have been suggested for this purpose; another related line of work is that of automaton splitting and replication, yielding designs that can tolerate faults as well as provide some form of privacy of the computation (see, e.g., [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] ). As mentioned above, only [7] addresses the unbounded-input-stream scenario.
Recall that in secure multi-party computation (MPC) [2, 4, 13] , parties (some of which might be corrupted) are to compute an -ary (public) function of their inputs, in such a way that no information is revealed about them beyond what is revealed by the function's output. At a high level, we similarly aim in our context to ensure the correctness and privacy of the distributed computation. However, as explained in [7] , our setting is signi cantly di erent from that of MPC whose de nitions and solutions cannot be directly applied here. The reason is two-fold: MPC protects players individual inputs, whereas in our setting the inputs are common to all players. Secondly and more importantly, MPC operates on inputs of xed length, which would require an a priori estimate on the maximum input size max and agents' storage linear in max . While unbounded inputs could be processed, for example by processing them "in blocks", this would require communication during the online phase which is not allowed in our setting. Refer to [7] for a more detailed discussion on the unbounded inputs setting vis-à-vis MPCs.
We note that using recently proposed fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) ( [11] and follow-ups) trivially solves the problem we pose, as under FHE the agents can simply compute arbitrary functions. In fact, plain additively homomorphic encryption (e.g., [14] ) can be used to encrypt the current state of the FSA and noninteractively update it as computation progresses, in a manner similar to what is described in our constructions (see the high-level intuition in Section 3). We note that public-key encryption and FHE su er from ordersof-magnitude computational overhead, as compared to the symmetric-key operations that we rely on. Perhaps more importantly, in this work we aim at minimizing the assumptions needed for e cient unbounded private distributed computation.
Finally, as mentioned above, the problem of share re-randomization and conversion has been considered in the literature. Related to our setting, Cramer, Damgård and Ishai [5] for example consider the problem of locally converting a secret sharing of a value into another secret sharing of the same value.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present in more detail the model, de nitions and building blocks that we use throughout the paper. We dedicate Section 3 to a high-level description of our constructions, while in Section 4 we present them in detail. The full privacy analysis is presented in Section 5.
Model and de nitions
A nite-state automaton (FSA) A has a nite set of states , a nite alphabet Σ, and a transition function : × Σ → . In this work we do not assume an initial state or a terminal state for the automaton, i.e., it may begin its execution from any state and does not necessarily stop.
We already described in the previous section the distributed computation setting, dealer, agents, adversary, and unbounded input stream, under which the FSA is to be executed. In more detail, we assume a global clock to which all agents are synchronized. We will assume that no more than one input symbol arrives during any clock tick. By input stream, we mean a sequence of input symbols arriving at a certain schedule of clock ticks. By abuse of notation, we will sometimes refer to the input without explicit reference to the schedule. (We note that the global clock requirement can in principle be removed if we allow the input schedule to be leaked to .) We also mentioned that is allowed to corrupt agents as the execution of the protocol proceeds. We consider the so-called passive or semi-honest adversary model, where corrupted agents can combine their views in order to learn protected information, but are not allowed to deviate from the protocol. Furthermore, each agent can be corrupted only once during an execution. When it does, can view the entire contents of a corrupted agent's memory.
However, we only allow corruptions of the following two types. Either the corruption is momentary, letting the adversary to read some of the internal state but retain no in uence on the agent after that event, or the corruption is such that the agent no longer receives the global input and therefore the adversary does not receive it either. The rst case, which is less likely in practical circumstances, leads to agents participating in the reconstruction. The second case -which is a likely outcome of the UAV application presented in the introduction -leads to reconstruction by at least − agents that have not been corrupted. In either case, the adversary does not receive global input after a corruption.
Incidentally, we consider event processing by an agent as an atomic operation. That is, agents cannot be corrupted during an execution of state update. This is a natural and easily achievable assumption, which allows us to not worry about some tedious details. The computation is then considered to be secure, if any two executions (possibly on di erent inputs and initial states -de ned more formally below) are "similarly" distributed.
This model of security for distributed computation on unbounded input streams was introduced in [7] as the progressive corruption model (PCM). It allowed to be computationally unbounded and in particular it required that the distributions of any two executions (again, more formally de ned below) be identical.
In this work we use a variant of PCM, applying the following two weakenings to its de nition: 1. Rather than requiring that the distributions of executions be identical, we require them to be computationally indistinguishable. This means that we guarantee security only against polynomial-time-bounded adversaries. 2. We require indistinguishability of executions for the same corruption timeline (and of course di erent input streams). For example, this means that agent IDs are now allowed to be included in the agents' views. (We use agent IDs in one of our constructions.) We stress that this is not a signi cant security weakening, as essentially we only allow the adversary to di erentiate among the agents' identities; the inputs and current state of the computation remain computationally hidden.
We now present our amended PCM de nition. We rst formalize the notion of corruption timeline and the view of the adversary.
De nition 2.1.
A corruption timeline is a sequence = (( 1 , 1 ), . . . , ( , )), where 1 , . . . , are the corrupted agents and 1 , . . . , ( 1 ≤ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≤ ) denote the time when the corresponding corruption took place. The length of a corruption timeline is | | = .
In this work, the distributed computational model is an FSA. However, each agent performing part of the computation on this FSA can be modeled more generally as a Turing machine, which includes an automaton and an in nite tape for input and computation.
De nition 2.2.
We say that the internal state of an agent is the state of its Turing machine's automaton together with the contents of its tape. We denote by VIEW Π ( , ) the probability distribution of the aggregated internal states of corrupted agents at the time of corruption, when executed on input and initial state .
De nition 2.3 (Computational privacy in the progressive corruption model).
We say that a distributed computation scheme Π is -private in the Progressive Corruption Model (PCM) if given a security parameter > 0, for every two states 1 , 2 ∈ , two input streams 1 , 2 , which have polynomial length in , and any corruption timeline , | | ≤ ,
Here, c ≈ denotes that two distributions are computationally indistinguishable for any family of circuits, which have polynomial size in , or equivalently for a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial time algorithm.
Tools and building blocks.
A pseudo-random generator (PRG) is a function of the form : → , where typically = {0, 1} and = {0, 1}
+ for some positive integers , . Recall that PRGs are known to exist based on the existence of one-way functions and that the security property of a PRG guarantees that it is computationally infeasible to distinguish its output on a value chosen uniformly at random from from a value chosen uniformly at random from (see, e.g., [12] ). In our setting, we will further assume that the old values of the PRG seeds are securely erased by the agents upon use and hence are not included in the view of the adversary. The other basic tool that our protocols make use of is ( , )-secret sharing [15] , where essentially a secret piece of information is "split" into shares and handed out to a set of players by a distinguished player called the dealer. The "split" is carried out in such a way that up to a threshold < of the players pooling together their shares are not able to learn anything about the secret, while + 1 are able to reconstruct the secret. We present the speci c instantiations of secret sharing as needed in the corresponding sections.
Overview of our approach
Let A be a publicly known automaton with a set of states denoted by = { 1 , . . . , }. Every agent stores the description of the automaton. In addition, during the computation for every state of A, every agent computes and stores its current label ℓ . As mentioned above, all agents receive a global input stream Γ = 1 , 2 , . . . , and perform computation in synchronized time steps.
At a high level, the main idea behind our constructions is that the state labels will be shares (à la secret sharing [15] ) of a secret which identi es the currently active state of A. More speci cally, for each of the automaton states, the state labels (held by the agents) will be shares of value 1 if the state is currently active and shares of 0 otherwise. We will show how the players' local computation on their shares will ensure that this property is maintained throughout the computation on the entire input stream Γ. When the input stream Γ is fully processed (or a stop signal is issued), the agents recover the current state by reconstructing the secrets corresponding to each automaton state. At the same time, a subset of less than a threshold of shares reveals no information on the current state of A.
We now present additional high-level details on two variants of the approach above. Recall that we consider the semi-honest adversary model, where corrupted players are not allowed to deviate from the protocol, but combine their views in order to learn protected information.
The ( , )-reconstruction. In this scenario, we require that all agents participate in the reconstruction of the secret (corrupted players are considered semi-honest and hence honestly provide their computed shares).
At the onset of computation, the shares are initialized using an ( , ) additive secret-sharing scheme, such that the initial state labels are the sharing of 1, and labels of each of the other states are shares of 0. When processing a global input symbol , each agent computes a new label for a state by summing the previous labels of all states ὔ such that ( ὔ , ) = . It is easy to see that due to the fact that we use additive secret sharing, the newly computed shares will maintain the desired secret-sharing property. Indeed, say that on an input symbol , states transition into state . If all of them were inactive and their labels were shares of 0s, then the newly computed shares will encode a 0 (as the sum of 0s). Similarly, if one of the predecessor states was active and its label shared a 1, then the new active state will also correspond to a share of 1.
A technical problem arises in the case of "empty" states, i.e., those that do not have incoming transitions for a symbol , and hence their labels are unde ned. Indeed, to hide the state of the automaton from the adversary who corrupts agent(s), we need to ensure that each label is a random share of the appropriate secret. Hence, we need to generate a random 0-share for each empty state without communication among the agents.
In the ( , ) sharing and reconstruction scenario, we will non-interactively generate these labels pseudorandomly as follows. Each pair of agents ( , ) will be assigned a random PRG seed seed . Then, at each event (e.g., processing an input symbol ), each agent will pseudo-randomly generate a string using each of the seeds seed , and set the label of the empty state to be the sum of all strings . This is done for each empty state independently. The PRG seeds are then (deterministically) "evolved" thereby erasing from the agent's view the knowledge of the labels' provenance, and making them all indistinguishable from random. As all agents are synchronized with respect to the input and the shared seeds, it is easy to see that the shares generated this way reconstruct a 0, since each string will be included twice in the total sum and hence will cancel out (we will use an appropriate secret-sharing scheme such that this is ensured. More precisely, we will perform our computation in a eld of characteristics 2).
Finally and intuitively, we observe that PCM security will hold since the view of each corrupted agent only includes pseudo-randomly generated labels for each state and the current PRG seed value. As noted above, even when combined with the views of other corrupted players, the labels are still indistinguishable from random.
The ( + 1, )-reconstruction. In this scenario, up to corrupted agents do not take part in the reconstruction (this is motivated by the possibility of agents being captured or destroyed by the adversary). Agents who submit their inputs, are doing it correctly. Thus, here we require > 2 .
We will take our ( , )-reconstruction solution as the basis, and adapt and expand it as follows. First, in order to enable reconstruction with − (≥ + 1) agents, we will use ( , ) additive secret-sharing (such as Shamir's [15] ). Second, as before, we will use a PRG to generate labels, but now we will have a separate seed for each subset of agents of size − + 1. Then, at each event (e.g., processing of an input symbol), each agent , for each of the groups it belongs to, will update its shares by generating a random ( , )-secret sharing of a 0 using the randomness generated by applying to the group's seed. Then, agent will use the share thus generated for the -th agent as its own, and set the label of the empty state to be the sum of all such shares.
Note that since agents are excluded from some of the groups and in this scenario up to agents might not return their state during reconstruction, special care must be taken in the generation of the re-randomizing polynomials so that all agents have invariantly consistent shares, even for groups they do not belong to, and that any set of agents of size + 1 enable the reconstruction of the secrets. (See Section 4.2 for details.) The above is done for each empty state independently. As before, the PRG seeds are then (deterministically) "evolved," making them all indistinguishable from random.
The algorithms we show for ( , )-reconstruction and ( − , )-reconstruction are similar enough to warrant a "template" algorithm, which can then be instantiated for each speci c algorithm. Algorithm 1 summarizes the update operations performed by agent (1 ≤ ≤ ) during the -th clock cycle. The algorithm receives an input and in addition a eld , a set E and a function which all depend on the protocol. The algorithm uses the following notation. Notation 3.1. Let P({ 1 , . . . , }) be the set of all subsets of agents. For a given E ⊆ P({ 1 , . . . , }), we let E = { ∈ E | ∈ }. Let || denote a concatenation of two strings. If at the clock cycle the agents do not receive an input symbol, we say that the input is not initialized for that cycle. Require: An input symbol ∈ Γ, a eld , a set E ⊆ P({ 1 , . . . , }) and a function : |E | → .
Ensure: New labels for every state. 1: if is initialized then 2: for = 1 to do 3: ℓ := ∑ , ( , )= ℓ . 4: for every ∈ E s.t.
∈ do 5: Compute || ← (seed ), where = ( 1 ) ||( 2 ) || ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ||( ) , ( ) ∈ , 1 ≤ ≤ and ∈ {0, 1} .
6:
seed +1 := . ℓ := ℓ + .
Remark 3.2.
Running this algorithm whenever an input symbol is received reveals the length of the input Γ processed by the players. Indeed, the stored seeds (or more precisely, their evolution which is traceable by the adversary by simply corrupting at di erent times players who share a seed) do reveal to the adversary the number of times the update function has been invoked. We hide the length of the input stream by requiring the agents to run updates at each clock cycle. This strategy reveals only the number of clock cycles, which is public knowledge.
The constructions in detail . The ( , )-reconstruction protocol
We start our formalization of the intuition presented above with the case where all out of the agents participate in the state reconstruction. The protocol for this case, which we call Π ( , ) , is presented below.
The eld in which arithmetic operations are performed in this protocol is ℤ 2 .
Protocol Π ( , ) . The protocol consists of three phases:
Initialization. The dealer secret-shares among the agents a secret value for each state, such that the value for the initial state is 1 and for all the other states is 0. This is done as follows. Agent (1 ≤ ≤ ) is given a random binary string 1 2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , with the constraints that
where init is the index of the initial state of the computation, and for every 1 ≤ ̸ = init ≤ ,
Each agent then proceeds to assign its state labels by ℓ ← . Event Processing. Each agent runs Algorithm 1, updating its labels and computing the new seeds for the PRG.
Besides the input letters, the input to the algorithm is as following, the eld, as mentioned, is ℤ 2 , the set E is the set of all possible pairs of agents, and the function is a sum,
Reconstruction. All agents submit their internal states to the dealer, who reconstructs the secrets corresponding to each state, by adding (mod 2) the shares of each state, and determining the currently active state (the one whose reconstructed secret is 1). Before proving the correctness and privacy achieved by the protocol, we illustrate the operation of the online (event processing) phase with the following example (refer to Figures 1 and 2) . The two gures describe the execution of the protocol on an automaton with four states and two possible inputs. Figure 1 presents the internal state of agent after the ( − 1)-th clock cycle. The agent holds the original automaton and has a label for each of the four states, (ℓ 1 ) −1 , (ℓ 2 ) −1 , (ℓ 3 ) −1 and (ℓ 4 ) −1 . Figure 2 shows the changes in the agent's internal state compared to Figure 1 after the -th clock cycle. We also assume that in this clock cycle the agents receive an input symbol . The new labels for each state are the sum of old labels and pseudo-random values. The labels in the sum are the old labels of all the states that transition to the current state given the input. Thus, the new (ℓ 2 ) includes a sum of the old (ℓ 2 ) −1 and the old (ℓ 4 ) −1 , while the new (ℓ 3 ) doesn't include any labels in its sum because there is no state that transitions to 3 after an input. The pseudo-random addition to each state = 1, 2, 3, 4 is the sum ∑ , ∈ ( ) .
We start by proving the correctness of the construction. Proof. We prove the proposition by induction on the number of steps that the automaton performs, i.e., the number of clock cycles. For the base case, if we consider the state of the protocol after the initialization step and before the rst clock cycle, i.e., at = 0, then the statement is true by our de nition of the label assignments. Let us rst consider the case where at the -th step an input symbol from Γ is received. Following the protocol, agent 's new label for state becomes ℓ ← :
Consider now the next state of the computation in the automaton; we wish to show that the secret corresponding to that state will be 1. Let curr be the index of the current state of the automaton and next be the index corresponding to the next state; by de nition, ( curr , ) = next . Then,
By the induction hypothesis, we know that Thus, if we sum over all the agents:
This is because in the last double sum every ( ) appears exactly once for every element in . By performing the same computation for all the other states of the automaton, one can see that they all give 0 as the result.
In the case where in the -th step no input symbol is received -due to the fact that we just add the random strings in the same way as in the case above -we again get that the secret corresponding to the current state of the computation is 1 and for all others is 0.
The next argument informally implies that the protocol is private in the PCM. A formal proof appears in Section 5. 
Sketch of proof.
Recall that the underlying observation is that when a corruption takes place (which cannot happen during the label-update procedure), the agent's state includes the current labels and PRG seeds which have already been evolved and hence cannot be correlated with the label shares previously generated. Without loss of generality, consider the case where corrupts all but one agent, say 1 , according to an arbitrary corruption timeline, We argue that the view of the adversary is indistinguishable from a view corresponding to (randomly) initialized agents 2 , . . . , on the given automaton and any initial state. In other words, the view of the adversary is indistinguishable from the view he would obtain if he corrupted the agents simultaneously and before any input was processed. Once we prove this, the proposition follows.
The view of each corrupted agent includes − 1 seeds that it shares with other agents, and the FSA labels which are secret shares of 0 or 1. We argue that from the point of view of the adversary, these labels are random shares of either 0 or 1. This follows from the PRG property that an evolved seed cannot be correlated with a prior output of the PRG and from the fact that 1 remains uncorrupted. Indeed, the newly generated "empty" states' labels look random since the adversary cannot link them to the PRG seeds in his view. The other states' labels look random to the adversary since they are XORed with 1 's label.
Thus, the total view of the adversary consists of random shares of 0 and 1, and is hence indistinguishable from the one corresponding to the initial state.
We can now calculate the time and storage complexity of Π ( , ) . At every step of the computation, each agent pseudo-randomly generates and XORs − 1 strings, each of length . Furthermore, each agent additionally to the automaton description, holds a small constant-length label for each automaton state and − 1 PRG seeds, yielding an ( + ) memory requirement.
. The ( − , )-reconstruction protocol
Recall that in this case, up to of the agents might not take part in the reconstruction, and thus > 2 . A straightforward (albeit costly) solution to this scenario would be to execute Π ( , ) independently for every subset of agents of size + 1 (assuming for simplicity = 2 + 1). This would involve each agent holding −1 copies of the automaton A, one copy for each such subset which includes , and updating them all as in Π ( , ) , according to the same input symbol. Now, during the reconstruction, the dealer can recover the output from any subset of + 1 agents. The cost of this approach would be as follows. Every agent holds −1 automata (one for every + 1 tuple that includes this agent), and executes Π ( , ) , which requires ( + ) memory, resulting in a total storage of ( −1 ⋅ ( + )), with the cost of computation per input symbol ( −1 ⋅ ( + )). In the sequel, we will refer to this approach as Π ( − , ) naive . We now present Π ( − , ) , an improved ( − , ) reconstruction scheme, whose intuition was already presented in Section 3. The protocol uses Shamir's secret-sharing scheme [15] , which we now brie y review. Let be a eld of size greater than , and ∈ be the secret. The dealer randomly generates coe cients 1 , 2 , . . . , from and constructs the polynomial ( ) = + 1 + 2 2 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + of degree . Let ⊆ be a set such that | | = and associate each agent with a unique element in . The set of agents is therefore { : ∈ }. The dealer gives each participant , ∈ , the value ( ). It can be easily seen that one can reconstruct the secret from any subset of at least + 1 points, and no information about the secret is revealed by points (or less).
Protocol Π ( − , )
. As before, the protocol consists of three phases:
Initialization. Using Shamir's secret sharing as described above, the dealer shares a secret 1 for the initial state and 0 for all other states. In addition, the dealer generates a random seed for every set of − ( − 1) = − + 1 agents and gives each agent the seeds for the sets it belongs to. Let E be the set of all possible subsets of − + 1 agents. Event Processing. Each agent runs Algorithm 1 updating its labels. The eld and the set E that the algorithm receives as an input are as de ned above. The description of the function is as follows. Let ∈ E and , 1 ≤ ≤ , be a state of the automaton. Upon obtaining the value (refer to Algorithm 1), the agents in (individually) construct a degree-polynomial , by de ning its value on the following + 1 eld points: 0, all the points such that ̸ ∈ , and such that is the minimal agent's index in for some publicly known order on the set (the choice of which point in is arbitrary). Now de ne (0) = 0, ( ) = 0 for all ̸ ∈ , and ( ) = .
Observe that by this de nition, every agent ∈ can use polynomial interpolation to compute ( ), since the only required information is and the knowledge of set membership.
Let polynomial be de ned as = ∑ ∈E . Each agent now computes ( ) (note that this is possible since the values corresponding to sets the agent does not belong to are set to 0), and updates the -th label, 1 ≤ ≤ , in Algorithm 1 by setting = ( ). Reconstruction. At least + 1 agents submit their internal state to the dealer, who, for every = 1, . . . , , views the -th labels of + 1 agents as shares in a Shamir secret-sharing scheme. The dealer reconstructs all the secrets using the scheme's reconstruction procedure, and determines and outputs the currently active state (whose recovered secret is equal to 1). Proof. We prove the proposition by induction on the number of clock cycles . We show that at each clock cycle , for every state , the labels ℓ 1 , . . . , ℓ are points on a degree polynomial whose free coe cient is 1 if is the current state and 0 otherwise. At initialization, the claim is true by our de nition of the label assignments.
Assume that the induction hypothesis is correct after − 1 clock cycles. We prove the hypothesis for the -th step. Assume rst that in this step the agents receive an input letter , and denote the current state by Therefore, ὔ ( ) = ℓ for every and every . In addition, since every is of degree and so is , we deduce that ὔ is also of degree . We nish proving the induction step by showing that ὔ (0) = 1 only for the correct state.
Let ( At a high level, the proof follows the steps of the proof of Proposition 4.2. A formal proof appears in Section 5. We now calculate the costs incurred by the protocol. The space complexity of each agent is as follows. An agent holds a label for every state, which is an element in . Since for every there exists a eld such that < | | ≤ 2 the total storage for the labels is ( ⋅ log ) bits. Additionally, every agent holds publicly known such that ∈ . Therefore, in this case is a product of all eld elements in the set , 1 ), . . . , ( , ) ) such that the adversary corrupts agent at time for = 1, . . . , and 1 ≤ 2 ≤ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≤ .
An agent in (Π, ) begins updating seed 0 only after the corruption of the rst agent that holds seed 0 . Therefore, at any time , ≤ , we have that seed = seed 0 . If ≥ + 1 the agent modi es seed as Π speci es for updating a seed.
An agent in (Π, ) begins updating a state label ℓ only after is corrupted at time . Therefore, when the adversary corrupts it obtains the initial label ℓ . For every clock cycle after the agent modi es ℓ as Π speci es for updating a label.
. Privacy of (Π, )
We show that if the corruption timeline is xed to then (Π, ) is private in the information-theoretic sense. In order to do so, we introduce the following de nition and lemma.
De nition 5.2. Let A be a set of agents, let = (A, E) be a hypergraph and let be a nite eld. We call a distribution hypergraph, if for every ∈ E, there is an element ∈ chosen uniformly at random, such that every ∈ holds and every ∉ has no information on . Proof. Let be an agent such that ̸ ∈ and there exists a hyper-edge ∈ E, such that ∈ and ∩ = . Since is chosen uniformly at random from , which is a eld, and ̸ = 0 we have that ℓ = ∑ , ∈ is distributed uniformly at random in and furthermore ℓ is independent of the adversary's view.
Conversely, assume that there exists an agent ̸ ∈ such that for every , ∈ , there exists an agent , ̸ = , such that ∈ ∩ . Then, the adversary obtains for every such that ∈ and can therefore compute ℓ without corrupting . naive , Π ( − , ) }, then for every two states 1 , 2 ∈ and for any two input streams 1 , 2 ∈ Γ * ,
Furthermore, the state labels of every uncorrupted agent are random elements in a nite eld that are distributed independently of the adversary's view.
Proof. The view of an adversary in (Π, ) is made up of the description of the automaton, the seeds and the labels. All of these are obtained from an agent at the moment of corruption. We construct a non-uniform, probabilistic, poly-time algorithm that is able to distinguish between
independent samples of and
independent samples of (seed) for a random seed ∈ {0, 1} . Since
is at most a polynomial in , the algorithm contradicts the assumption that is a pseudo-random generator, thus proving the proposition. Denote the distribution on independent samples of (seed) by long .
Algorithm :
The algorithm is hard-wired with , and . It receives as input a description of the automaton, , and . In addition, the algorithm receives as input a binary string of length 2 −1 −1 ( | | + ) and decides whether it is chosen from long or long by performing the following steps. (i) Choose a random in the range 1, 2, . . . , ( ).
(ii) Simulate the operation of the agents 1 , . . . , in the scheme (Π, ) for the rst − 1 clock cycles. (iii) In the -th clock cycle all the agents that have already been corrupted, i.e., in cycles 1 to − 1, execute Π (which is identical to (Π, ) for a corrupted agent). For any uncorrupted player -including those that are corrupted in the -th cycle -do the following: (a)Update any seed that is shared with a corrupted player as speci ed by Π (which is identical to the update process of (Π, ) for such seeds). (b)For any seed that is shared by a set of uncorrupted agents , select a fresh string of length | | + from and parse it as || for ∈ {0, 1} and = 1 || ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ || . Replace the previous seed with . (c) Recall that in every Π the label of the -th state, = 1, . . . , , is updated by a linear combination of previous state labels and of elements derived from expanded seeds. updates the label in a similar way, except that for every such that is shared by uncorrupted agents, is selected from as described in the previous step instead of being selected from an expanded seed. We argue that if is chosen from long , then the view of the adversary that simulates is , while if is chosen from long , then the view of that adversary is −1 . Obviously, the view that the adversary obtains in the rst − 1 clock cycles is identical to the view in (Π, ) and the view in the last ( ) − clock cycles is identical to the view in Π. Therefore, we need to prove that the view in the -th clock cycle is identical to (Π, ) if is uniformly random and identical to Π if is selected from long .
(Π, ) speci es identical processing to Π for corrupted agents and seeds shared by corrupted agents. Therefore, the di erences are in seeds that are shared only by uncorrupted agents and in state labels of uncorrupted agents.
In the -th clock cycle, replaces seeds that are shared by uncorrupted agents with strings selected from . If is uniformly random then these seeds are uniformly random. Therefore, in this case the distribution of the seeds is identical to the expected distribution of seeds if (Π, ) is executed in the previous clock cycle − 1. If is a sequence of elements of the form (seed), where seed is random, then the new seed, is exactly as speci ed by Π after a single clock tick. That is, the expected distribution of the agents run Π in the previous clock tick − 1.
The state labels are updated by a linear combination in which the coe cients of each are non-zero. If is uniformly random then each is a random eld element in and therefore each state label is a random eld element in . By Proposition 5.4 that is identical to the distribution of state labels in (Π, ). If is a sequence of elements of the form ( ), where is random, then the new label is exactly as speci ed by Π after a single clock tick.
The argument above shows that once is given, distinguishes between a sequence of uniform elements and a sequence of pseudo-random elements with the same probability that distinguishes between and
